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This paper analyses the causes of the precipitous fall in trade among the
twelve CIS countries since 1990; points out the implications for industrial
restructuring; and discusses the policy options for regional reintegration.
The main finding is that the decline in intra-C!S trade was initiated by the
institutional void left by the collapse of the central planning system.
However, the high volume of trade among the former Soviet republics
reflected largely their isolation from the rest of the world economy, as well
as other policy-induced distortions. Therefore, if market-oriented
economic reforms in the CIS countries are successful, intra-CIS trade
flows will remain substantially smaller than during the Soviet period.
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1
The purpose of this paper is first, to identify the main causes of the
decline in trade among the CIS countries since 1990. This will be followed
by a discussion of the implications for trade policy reform and overall
systemic change in the Post-Soviet states.
2
It is widely accepted that during the Soviet period, economic planners
aimed at achieving a high degree of autarky from the rest of the world
while operating an intensive division of labour among the member
republics of the Soviet Union. In the medium to long run, the market-
oriented economic reforms begun in 1992 can therefore be expected to
lead to a decline in the relative importance of intra-CIS trade compared to
trade with the rest of the world. However, a reduction in the relative weight
of intra-CIS trade need not be accompanied by, and thus does not
constitute a sufficient explanation for the large decrease in its volume.
Explanations may be sought in two broad directions: On the one hand, the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union may have created "artificial"
1 This is a contribution to L.T. Orlowski and D. Salvatore (eds.), Trade and
Payments in Central and Eastern Europe's Transforming Economies; to be
published as Volume 6, Handbooks of Comparative Economic Policies,
Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, CT, The paper draws on the authors'
involvement in several research projects on the external economic relations of
CIS countries. In the course of these projects we have greatly benefited from
discussions with many colleagues in the CIS countries and elsewhere. All errors
remain our own.
2 This discussion does not extend to the Baltic countries because their
development perspectives, policy environments, and position in the international
trading system are diverging more and more from those of the remaining Post-
Soviet states.barriers to trade among the former Soviet republics in the sense that, if
these barriers were eliminated, trade would return to its former level.
Similarly, if the reduction in trade was mainly caused by macroeconomic
fluctuations, trade could be expected to recover with the next upturn. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that a large proportion of the trade flows
among the former Soviet republics reflected distortions induced by the
central planning system. Such trade flows may become unviable as
market-oriented reforms are implemented in the CIS countries, and intra-
CIS trade will be permanently reduced. The validity of these (partly
conflicting) hypotheses is assessed in Section 3 of this paper.
The following section prepares the ground by surveying the available data
on trade among the CIS countries since 1990. These data suffer not only
from the usual inadequacies of the statistical reporting systems of the CIS
countries, such as reliance on enterprise surveys rather than customs
data for foreign trade statistics.
3 The data are also difficult to interpret
because they are simultaneously affected by sharply declining trade
volumes, very high inflation, and substantial changes in relative prices.
We present estimates by Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994) who attempt to
disentangle these various effects, and analyse changes in the commodity
composition of intra-CIS trade on the basis of trade volumes of important
products.
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss the policy implications of this analysis,
starting with the continuing need for institutional reforms to allow intra-CIS
trade to take place on a free market basis (Subsection 4.1). A crucial
Such surveys tend to underestimate trade because they usually cover only state-
owned enterprises and do not account for the foreign trade of joint ventures,
foreign-owned and private domestic firms (Illarionov, 1994).question is posed by the potential role of intra-CIS regional integration in
trade policy reform, and by the choice of an appropriate institutional
framework (Subsection 4.2). Subsection 4.3 considers the implication of
intra-CIS integration from the point of view of OECD partner countries.
Section 5 concludes on the main findings.
2. Trade Among the CIS Countries Since 1990: Volume, Direction,
and Commodity Composition
The first Soviet publication containing comprehensive data on the
direction and commodity composition of inter-republican trade appears to
have been Vestnik Statistiki (1990), covering the years 1987 and 1988.
Trade flows were expressed in internal producer prices, which deviated
substantially from world market prices. As regards the commodity
composition, the published data were only disaggregated down to the
level of about twelve broadly defined sectors, although more detailed data
(at the level of 105 sectors) were subsequently made available to Western
researchers (Tarr 1993).
4
Since 1991, the statistical reporting system maintained by the Soviet
Goskomstat on a union-wide basis has collapsed in large part along with
the union-wide economic planning mechanism, and has not yet been
replaced by statistical systems appropriate for market economy conditions
on the part of the newly founded national statistical offices. The limited
data on the total nominal value of trade that have become available since
4 These data were not collected by statistical authorities on a regular basis, but
were apparently constructed using input-output matrices for the individual
republics and foreign trade data for the whole former Soviet Union (Illarionov,
1994).then are estimated largely on the basis of payment flows. Furthermore,
these data are difficult to interpret for two related reasons: The
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to large increases in the real
prices of some goods that had been systematically undervalued, with
concomitant declines in the physical volumes of trade. At the same time,
nominal trade values in Russian rubles increased vastly because of
hyperinflation. Therefore it is difficult, without detailed information on the
commodity composition of trade, to distinguish the changes in the terms
of trade from changes in trade volumes.
The most comprehensive estimates available of the evolution of the CIS
countries' external trade have been produced by the World Bank
(Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994). They relate to the years 1990 through
1993 when a large part of the adjustment of relative prices in inter-state
trade to world market conditions took place. The basic approach was to
convert current trade values denominated in Russian rubles into
US dollars at implicit exchange rates based on world market prices.
Estimates of the commodity composition of trade and of current ruble
prices for individual commodity groups were taken from a variety of
sources and in some cases are based on heroic assumptions.
Nevertheless, these are the best data available.
Table 1 presents a summary of these estimates as well as preliminary
1994 data from the CIS Statistical Committee. In spite of the general
uncertainty affecting the data, several trends can be identified: First,
sharply rising trade values in current Russian rubles from 1990 through
1994 demonstrate the impact of hyperinflation. Second, the volume of
trade among the CIS countries decreased by almost two thirds from 1990





























































































































































































































































(converted at commercial exchange rates)
124 159
629 461
3 092 3 348
295 433
3 126 3 576
282 378
636 743
15 752 10 546
118 198
1 731 876
5 669 9 185
2 085 2 225



























Source: Michalopoulos andTarr (1994); Statkora SNG, Statistichcskiy Bjulletin', 199S, No. 3.exchange rates. Third, the share of intra-regional trade in the total trade of
CIS countries declined somewhat in the case of exports (from 74 percent
of total exports in 1990 and 65 percent in 1993), but did not change
markedly on the import side.
5
Implicit exchange rates for the conversion of current trade values
denominated in Russian rubles into US dollars are not available for 1994.
A comparison is possible, however, between trade values in 1993 and
1994 converted into US dollars at the market exchange rate. Apart from
further adjustments in relative prices, it is important to note that this
comparison is also affected by the real appreciation of the Russian ruble
from 1993 to 1994. Hence the volume of trade almost certainly decreased
by more than one fifth (which is the rate of decline suggested by the
figures in Table 1, i.e. from approximately 33 to 26 billion US dollars).
The 1994 data also show that only Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan
ran surpluses in intra-CIS trade. In principle at least, Russia intends to
stop subsidising its partner countries through soft loans to finance balance
5 It is difficult to say whether the apparent exceptions from these trends in the case
of certain countries are genuine or the result of statistical errors. Not surprisingly,
especially large declines in trade volumes were registered by states that were
involved in military conflicts, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Tadzhikistan. Intra-CIS exports by Ukraine fell by 71 percent, while its
corresponding imports were reduced by only 51 percent. That discrepancy
probably reflects the preponderance of heavy industry in Ukrainian exports,
which suffered a particularly large decline in demand, as well as the dependency
of Ukraine on imports of energy materials whose consumption was impossible to
reduce in the short run. Less-than-average declines in trade volumes were
registered by Belarus and Kazakhstan, whose governments attempted for some
time to halt the economic decline by maintaining a large measure of state control
over their economies.of trade deficits. As few of these countries run significant trade surpluses
with the rest of the world or enjoy access to the private international
capital market, they will only be able to sustain their trade deficits in
relation to Russia if they obtain concessionary financing. Otherwise, more
downward adjustment in intra-CIS trade will be inevitable.
Although Russia accounts for about one half of total intra-regionai exports
and one third of intra-regional imports by CIS countries, the relative
importance of trade with Russia varies considerably among the individual
CIS countries. Table 2 presents the direction of trade among the CIS
countries in 1994. Trade among the European CIS countries (Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) accounted for a particularly large proportion of
their total intra-CIS trade (Russia: 74,2 percent of exports and
73,0 percent of imports; Ukraine: 94,0 percent and 90,5 percent,
respectively; Belarus: 94,5 percent and 97,6 percent; Moldova:
90,9 percent 98,4 percent). In the case of Russia, these figures rise to
89,3 percent of exports and 89,5 percent of imports when neighbouring
Kazakhstan is included in this group. As the largest CIS economy, Russia
is also the most important trading partner of most of the Caucasian and
other Central Asian republics. At the same time, however, the latter also
trade amongst themselves to a significant extent.
Although no comprehensive data are available on the commodity
composition of intra-CIS trade, the direction of trade in roughly 60
important products, measured in physical quantities, among all 12 CIS
countries has been published for the years 1990 through 1994.
6. These
6 Data for are not available in 1990, and only a few data have so far been





















































































































































































































































































































































Source: Statkom SNG, Statisticheskiy Bjulletin', 1995, No. 3.10
data are summarised in Table 3. Products have been aggregated into four
categories (industrial intermediates, capital goods, food, other consumer
goods), and median rates of change of exports and imports have been
calculated for each product category and CIS country.
Although the data are quite heterogeneous, it may be concluded that at
the aggregate level of total intra-CIS trade, no significant differences exist
between the rates of change for the four product groups. From 1990
through 1993, trade in all categories declined by broadly similar rates. It is
too early to judge whether the apparent, less rapid fall in trade in food
products between 1993 and 1994 (compared with industrial
intermediates) represents a turning point. If all product groups
experienced similar declines, it follows that the share of industrial
intermediates in the current nominal value of intra-CIS trade must have
increased substantially in line with the increase in their relative prices.
3. Causes for the Decline in Trade
A wide variety of factors have been cited as possible causes of the fall in
trade among the CIS countries. This section distinguishes between the
immediate causes of the decline, which are essentially short-term
developments that may be reversed, and structural adjustment in the
course of market-oriented economic reforms, i.e. the elimination of
systemic distortions that used to favor intra-CIS trade. As regards short-
term factors, the sharp decline in inter-state trade after 1990 raised the
question whether the process was initiated primarily by falling aggregate
demand, or rather by the erection of new trade barriers among the Newly
Independent States and the breakdown of institutions crucial to the























































































































































































































































































































































Source: Statkom SNG, Mezhgosudarstvennyiy obmen tovarami narodnogo protrebleniya v 1991 g. Moscow 1992; Mezhgosudarstvennyiy obmen produktsiey proizvodsvenno -
tekhnichcskogo naznacheniya v 1991 g. Moscow 1992; Mezhgosudarstvennyiy obmen produktsiey proizvodsvenno - tekhnickeskogo naznacheniya i potrebitel'skimi
tovarami v 1993 g., Moscow 1994; Statisticheskiy Bjulletin', 1995, No. 3; own calculations.4es fnsfiruts fnr
Subsection 3.2 analyses the extent and future relevance of four sources
of distortions that may have favored intra-CIS trade in the past, and.are
now bound to be eliminated by market-oriented economic reforms:"
inappropriately low prices for raw materials (especially energy) and
environmental sources (Subsection 3.2.1); arbitrary location of enterprises
due to insufficient attention to the true transport and coordination costs
(Subsection 3.2.2); excessively large enterprises because control costs
are lower when there are fewer individual enterprises (Subsection 3.2.3);
and politically motivated isolation from trade with the rest of the world
(Subsection 3.2.4).
3.1 Output Decline, Collapse of Institutions, Barriers to Trade
The decline in intra-CIS trade coincided with a substantial fall in
aggregate output in the CIS countries, with the collapse of the payments
system among the former Soviet republics, and with the erection of
various trade barriers (mostly export controls) between the post-Soviet
states. This process started as early as 1990, and hence before any
market-oriented economic reforms were undertaken that might have lead
to structural adjustment. Together, therefore, these interrelated
developments may safely be regarded as primarily responsible for
initiating the decline in trade.
There is no need to describe the evaluation of events in detail because
they have been documented extensively elsewhere (for example: IMF,
1994). Two interrelated issues are of wider importance, however, and will
be discussed briefly. First, what is the relative importance of the three
factors in causing the decline in intra-CIS trade? This question was raised
especially in 1992 and 1993 because the policy implications following
from each possible cause differed, and there seemed to be a good14
chance of halting the decline in trade through stop-gap policy measures.
Second, what is the continuing relevance of these factors now that
considerable progress has been made in creating institutions appropriate
for market economy conditions?
On the first question, it seems clear that the output decline had a large
impact on intra-CIS trade. This immediately raises the additional question
of what caused the output decline. The literature has identified a variety of
contributing factors, including demand constraints (reduced state orders
for military equipment, tight macroeconomic policies), supply side factors
(slow adjustment to changing relative prices), institutional constraints, and
statistical inaccuracies (overestimation of true output decline) (Rosati
1994). Schmieding (1993) concludes from a detailed evaluation of
alternative explanations that the single most important cause of the output
collapse must have been the institutional void experienced by the
transition economies: When the central planning mechanism had broken
down, the transition economies lacked most of the institutions that are
crucial for facilitating economic transactions in market economies. This
conclusion has particular force in the case of the former Soviet Union. The
decline in aggregate output and inter-republican trade started as early as
1990 when centralized control over the economy began to crumble. By
contrast, market-oriented economic reforms which may have entailed
structural adjustment were only implemented as from the beginning of
1992.
Apart from the output decline, there is evidence that the decline in intra-
CIS trade was accelerated by the disintegration of the Soviet payments
system and new trade barriers (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994).
Specifically, Anderson (1993) has shown with the help of a computable
general equilibrium model of the former Soviet economy (distinguishing15
Russia from the remaining republics) that in 1992 intra-CIS trade declined
by more than one would have expected given the fall in aggregate output.
The imposition of trade barriers, mainly in the form of export controls, can
be traced to the bilateralization of economic relations among the CIS
countries after the ruble zone broke down (cf. IMF (1994) for a detailed
discussion). In that sense it may be stated that the decline in intra-CIS
trade was accelerated by the breakdown of institutions (particularly the
payments system) that had been its backbone during the Soviet period. It
was against this background that proposals were made for a payments
union among the CIS countries in the framework of an Inter-State Bank.
Gros (1994) discusses the rationale for this project as well as the reasons
for its failure to materialize.
In assessing the continuing relevance of these factors, two points need to
be noted. First, as of mid-1995, many obstacles to trade have been
eliminated. Nearly all CIS countries now have national currencies that are
convertible at least against the Russian Ruble for current transactions.
Financial system reforms have led to the establishment of currency
markets and networks of correspondent accounts among commercial
banks. Hence there now exists a working (though still expensive)
payments system for intra-CIS transactions.
Second, the institutional void created by the demise of the central
planning system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union only initiated
the decline in intra-CIS trade. Therefore trade will not automatically
recover when new institutions are put in place. The ongoing systemic
transformation will progressively eliminate the distortions caused by the
central planning mechanism. Hence some production activities and trade
relationships which went into decline initially because of the collapse of
institutions, may become permanently unviable. The following16
Subsection 3.2 discusses the empirical evidence on the extent of such
distortions.
3.2 Structural Adjustment
3.2.1 Adjustment of Relative Prices
During the Soviet period, producer prices for goods were calculated on a
"cost-plus" basis, and served merely for accounting purposes. As a result,
natural resources were undervalued (relative to world market prices)
because resource rents were not included in the producer price, while
many capital goods that were manufactured inefficiently were
correspondingly overpriced (Orlowski 1993). It may be noted for the sake
of clarity that consumer prices, on the other hand, were set to equate the
quantity demanded to (politically determined) supply. The resulting
differences between producer and retail prices were covered by product-
specific consumption taxes or subsidies.
It is sometimes stated by Western observers that Soviet central planners
based their investment decisions not on accounting prices but on shadow
or world market prices. Such behaviour would certainly be plausible,
particularly in the case of raw materials where the opportunity cost of
domestic resource use in terms of export revenue foregone is especially
obvious. This assertion is contradicted, however, by the frequently
documented, excessive use of raw materials and energy throughout the
Soviet economy, including household consumption. Therefore it seems a
tenable assumption that the structure of the post-Soviet economies was
the result of a planning process based on input prices that were not
fundamentally different from the prevailing producer prices. By implication,17
world market prices had only a limited impact on the choice of production
technologies.
Since 1992, prices in intra-CIS trade have gradually been adjusted to
reflect world market conditions. Furthermore, the explicit, budgetary
income transfers among the former Soviet republics were eliminated in
1992 (cf. Orlowski 1995). They were replaced by inter-governmental
credits whose conditions became increasingly market-oriented during the
following years. Hence the budget constraints faced by the governments
of CIS countries in intra-CIS trade have been hardened considerably. This
process benefited especially the net energy exporters among the CIS
countries: Russia's terms of trade in intra-CIS trade improved by
20 percent between 1990 and 1993, and Turkmenistan's by 52 percent.
All other CIS countries saw their terms of trade deteriorate: moderately in
the case of relatively resource-rich countries such as Azerbaijan
(-2 percent), Kazakhstan (-3 percent), Uzbekistan (-8 percent), and
Ukraine (-11 percent); strongly in Belarus (-17 percent) and Kyrgyzstan
(-19 percent); and by 25 percent or more in the remaining countries
(Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1994, Table 1.9).
CIS countries with deteriorating terms of trade needed to depreciate their
national currencies in real terms, which implies a reduction of the prices of
non-tradables relative to tradables (or, equivalents, a reduction of the
wage rate measured in foreign currency). The decline in real income can
then be expected to reduce import volumes of all product categories,
while the relative price effect should result in a particularly large reduction
in the imports of energy and raw materials. On the other hand, one would
expect to see increased exports whose competitive position should be
strengthened by the devaluation.18
In reality, however, no such increase in exports from countries with
deteriorating terms of trade occurred. One probable reason is that
changing terms of trade coincided with the liberalization of Russia's
foreign trade with the rest of the world (cf. Subsection 3.2.4 below). Due
to technological backwardness, for example, CIS exporters were probably
unable to expand or even maintain their export sales in the face of
increasing competition from non-CIS suppliers, especially in light
industries. Their competitiveness in relation to Russian producers may
also have been hampered by the fact that Russian enterprises continued
to benefit from lower energy prices than those prevailing either in the
world market or in Russian exports to CIS countries. Due to such
constraints on export expansion, the deteriorating terms of trade of net-
energy-importing CIS countries were absorbed almost entirely by import
compression. Only to a limited extent could imports could be financed by
external credits which had to be obtained at increasingly market-oriented
conditions.
3.2.2 Declining Competitiveness of Arbitrarily Located Enterprises
It has frequently been asserted that the location of many enterprises in
the former Soviet Union was determined by political rather than economic
considerations. Their economic viability might therefore be endangered by
market-oriented economic reforms. Decisions on location might have
been guided, for example, by regional policy objectives, or by a politically
motivated desire to make non-Russian, potentially independence-minded
republics economically dependent on the rest of the Soviet Union, or by
strategic considerations (such as rendering militarily important industries
less vulnerable in the case of war). Similarly, neglect of transportation
costs (because energy was underpriced) could also have meant that19
enterprises were located in areas where their economic viability would be
threatened under market economy conditions.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that politics played a role in the
location of particular enterprises. This relates especially to some strategic
industries, such as aluminium plants. It is difficult, however, to find
sufficient direct evidence to permit a comprehensive view. What is more,
two pieces of indirect evidence suggest that distortions in the division of
labour among the former Soviet republics have been limited (taking as
given the country's politically determined economic isolation from the rest
of the world).
First, the direction of trade among the member republics of the former
Soviet Union is correctly predicted by a gravity model (Gros and
Dautrebande 1992). That is, bilateral trade was higher the higher the
gross domestic products of the two republics (reflecting higher absorptive
capacity), and the closer they were geographically (reflecting lower
transportation costs). This is the same pattern as found among market
economies.
Second, the commodity composition of inter-republican trade followed by
and large the pattern predicted by Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory (Liicke
1992; a similar finding is reported by Murrel 1990, for the foreign trade
patterns of all East European countries). Republics with high levels of
human and physical capital per head specialized in the production and
export of relatively sophisticated products, and vice versa. This is what
one would expect as the result of a rational planning process.
In sum, this indirect evidence supports the conclusion that the most
important distortion affecting the structure of the economies of the former
member republics of the Soviet Union was not a suboptimal division of20
labour among the republics, but the country's economic isolation from the
rest of the world (Subsection 3.2.4 discusses this point in detail). The
emphasis that some observers have placed on supposedly arbitrary
location decisions within the former Soviet Union appears to be based on
anecdotal evidence that conveys a somewhat misleading impression.
3.2.3 Restructuring of Larger-than-Optimal Enterprises
It has frequently been argued that the efficiency of Soviet industry
suffered from an excessive average size of enterprises. This might have
been the result of the central planning mechanism in the sense that a
given quantity of output may be easier to "plan" when it comes from a
smail number of large production units, rather than a larger number of
relatively small plants. Large size would have implied that many
enterprises were monopolists or oligopolists, especially in the capital
goods industries where economies of scale are important relative to the
size of the Soviet or East European market. Such market power, in turn,
would have limited the incentives for enterprises to maintain a high
standard of efficiency.
Alternatively, it is conceivable that relatively large production units were
established in order to take advantage of economics of scale. Economics
of scale, however, are limited by the extent of the market. Large
production volumes of a limited number of product varieties were probably
consistent with the preferences of central planners. Under market
economy conditions, however, demand will become increasingly
differentiated. Large production units, with traditional technologies
embodied in sometimes outdated equipment, may lack the flexibility to
respond to such changes in consumer preferences. Both insufficient
flexibility and monopoiy-induced inefficiency may have placed many large21
enterprises in a difficult position when they faced increasing competition
after the liberalization of foreign trade in many CIS countries in 1992. This
process may have contributed to the decline in intra-CIS trade.
The hypothesis of widespread monopolism is usually supported by
reference to Soviet statistics listing a large number of products (mostly
from the metal and engineering industries) for which there existed only
one or a few producers (e.g. Kroll 1991). This approach has been
challenged by Brown etal. (1993) who argue that looking at monopolistic
positions at the product level is misleading because, under market
economy conditions, enterprises might diversify their output portfolios into
related product ranges. Brown et al. (1993) carefully evaluate data on
Russian industry from the 1987 Soviet Census of Industry which have
recently become available in machine-readable format, with enterprises
grouped according to the United States Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC). If the four-digit level of the SIC is accepted as representing the
possible range of diversification, then industry in Russia was not
significantly more monopolistic than in the United States.
It is important to notice that Brown etal. (1993) compare Russian
"enterprises" to US "firms". Both entities may consist of several separate
plants or, technically speaking, establishments. It is therefore conceivable
that establishments in the former Soviet Union were excessively large by
market economy standards, although this was not apparent at the firm or
enterprise level because US firms on average consisted of a larger
number of establishments. Although the available data are difficult to
compare, Liicke (1994) concludes tentatively that, on average,
manufacturing establishments in the former Soviet Union were indeed
larger than in the United States or Western Europe.22
In addition, small and medium-sized enterprises (with up to 500
employees, for instance) account for a significant proportion of
employment and output in most manufacturing industries in the US and
Western Europe, but are practically non-existent in the former Soviet
Union. It is frequently argued that such firms represent a particularly
dynamic sector of industry, quick to exploit new opportunities and flexibly
adjusting to changing conditions. As a result, they have accounted for a
disproportionate share of newly created industrial jobs in many Western
countries during the last two decades. Therefore, even if the impression of
wide-spread monopolism in the former Soviet Union is incorrect, the
absence of small- and medium-sized firms is bound to slow down the
structural adjustment of CIS manufacturing and to reduce the
competitiveness of local firms vis-a-vis suppliers from outside the region.
7
3.2.4 Overcoming Past Isolation from the World Economy
The former Soviet Union was characterized by a highly developed division
of labour among its constituent republics. Trade with the rest of the world
(including the member countries of the former Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance), however, was far smaller than one would have
expected on the basis of the country's size and the trade to GDP ratios
found in market economies (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994, Table 1.8).
This was not only the result of voluntary isolation from the rest of the
world, but also of trade barriers on the part of OECD countries (Pohl and
Another implication of the large average size of establishments was that the
manufacturing sector in individual regions of the former Soviet Union was less
diversified than in the United States (Lucke, 1994). Hence structural adjustment
will probably be more painful because fewer alternative employment
opportunities are locally available for redundant labour from shrinking industries.23
Sorsa 1992). Restrictions on exports of high technology goods to the
Soviet Union (and to other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization)
played an important role in preventing the Soviet Union from integrating
into the international division of labour according to its comparative
advantage.
As a result, the overall trade dependence of the CIS countries today is not
much higher than in market economies of comparable size, considering
their total trade to GDP ratios. What seems excessive, however, is the
share of intra-CIS in total trade. One would expect that, as the after-
effects of the iron curtain disappear in the course of time, the CIS
'it" '•".
countries will tend to re-orient a large proportion of their trade away from
the region towards the rest of world.
Gros and Dautrebande (1992) have used a gravity model approach to
develop estimates of the "long-run" share of intra-regional trade in the
total foreign trade of CIS countries, assuming that their trade follows the
same pattern as trade among market economies. The gravity model
explains the value of trade between pairs of countries as a function of
their respective gross domestic products ("mass"), and of the transaction
costs of trade between them ("distance"). Transaction costs depend on
such factors as geographic distance (affecting transport costs), trade
policy (for example, common membership in a regional integration
scheme), and cultural affinity (for example, common language, legal
systems, etc.). Since model specification (especially of the variables
representing "distance") may affect estimates considerably, Gros and
Dautrebande have employed coefficients from three separate studies
(Aitken 1973; Wang and Winters 1991; Havrylyshyn and Pritchett 1991).24
The findings by Gros and Dautrebande (1992) support the view that if and
when the systemic transformation in the CIS economies is successful,
trade among the CIS countries will play a much reduced role relative to
trade with countries outside the region. Applying the coefficients from
Aitken (1973) and Wang and Winters (1991) results in estimates of the
long-run, intra-CIS trade shares of less than 20 percent for all CIS
countries, and less than 10 percent for Russia. Using the Havrylyshyn
and Pritchett (1991) coefficients gives intra-CIS shares of no more than
25 percent for the European CIS countries as well as Uzbekistan,
Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan, between 25 and 30 percent for the three
Caucasian states, 34 percent for Kazakhstan, and 50 percent for
Kyrgyzstan.
Although these estimates are merely illustrative, their plausibility is
strengthened by the observation that in many developing countries the
share of trade with other developing countries in the same region is in the
order of 10 percent (UNCTAD Handbook, Table 1.13, current issues). The
somewhat higher estimates for the CIS countries reflect the fact that due
to its economic size and geographical proximity, Russia is a "natural
trading partner" for most of the other CIS countries (on the concept of
"natural trading partners" see Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989; Jacquemin and
Sapir, 1991; Kreinin and Plummer, 1992).
Furthermore, gravity models that reflect the pattern of trade among long-
established market economies probably underestimate the difference in
transaction costs among CIS countries on the one hand, and between
CIS countries and the rest of the world on the other. In the medium term
at least, there will probably be elements of path dependence that cause
intra-CIS trade to remain relatively more important than the pattern of
trade among market economies would suggest. For example, cultural25
affinity is likely to remain of crucial importance in terms of being able to
communicate in Russian, knowing and trusting trading partners because
of long-standing relationships, and being used to conducting business
under great legal and economic uncertainty.
To some extent, enterprises in the CIS countries are also locked into
traditional, energy-intensive technologies for which intermediate goods,
spare parts, etc. can only be obtained from CIS sources and for which,
conversely, no market exists outside the region. At the same time, foreign
exchange constraints may prevent the CIS countries from quickly
replacing traditional technological by state-of-the-art equipment imported
from market economies.
Furthermore, Russian attempts to maintain a dominating political and
economic influence over the countries in the "near abroad" (meaning, in
practice, all CIS member states) also constitute a particular form of path
dependence. Such political pressures are exemplified by the hostile
Russian reaction to Azerbaijan's plans to build an oil pipeline to Turkey or
Iran in order to become less dependent on the Russian pipeline network
for its oil exports. It is not entirely clear what policies the Russian
government intends to pursue in its relations with the "near abroad".
8
Hence it is also unclear what links between the "near abroad" and
Western countries Russia will be prepared to tolerate, and at what stage
(and by what means) Russia would intervene.
8 In the case of the Azeri pipeline project, part of the problem may have been that
the Russian state oil company was supposed to play only a small role in the
project.26
At any rate, Russia could use at least two levers in the narrowly economic
sphere to restrict Hnks between the other CIS member states and the rest
of the world. First, many CIS countries depend on transit routes through
Russia for their non-CIS exports (such as Azerbaijan for its oil exports).
Most states are landlocked; transport links to neighbouring countries
outside the former Soviet Union remained underdeveloped during the
Soviet period, and now take time to expand. In addition to a well-working
transport network, goods in transit require special facilities such as sealed
means of transport, bonded warehouses, duty-free storage facilities,
transshipment areas in harbours or airports, etc. Even if such
arrangements are not regarded as important by the CIS countries, they
are prerequisites for establishing the origin of goods to which preferential
tariffs are to be applied (such as under the Generalised System of
Preferences from which practically all CIS member states now benefit in
most OECD markets). Creating the necessary conditions for the smooth
transit of goods will therefore require the political goodwill of, and
significant administrative effort by the Russian government. That gives
Russia substantial leverage in its relations with many of the smaller CIS
member states.
Secondly, Russia's position as a very large trading partner for most CIS
states makes it difficult for the latter to pursue trade policies that differ
radically from Russia's. On the one hand, imposing higher prices for
particular goods than Russia would create incentives for smuggling, tariff
evasion and other illegal activities which would be difficult to contain
because of widespread problems with law enforcement. On the other
hand, if Russia decided to pursue a significantly more protectionist trade
policy, it could present the smaller states with the options of either joining
a highly protectionist customs union, or being treated like any third27
country as regards access to the Russian market. Faced with this
alternative, the smaller states might well feel obliged to join an integration
scheme that would adopt more protectionist policies against imports from
third countries than they would impose if they could act individually.
Alternatively, as the main supplier of some essential products facing
inelastic demand in CIS countries, Russia could even act strategically and
impose optimal export taxes to improve its terms of trade. In doing so, it
could induce other CIS states to lower their import taxes on these goods
and seek compensation by raising import taxes on other products that are
regarded as less essential. In this way, Russia would influence the import-
tax-raising capacity of the smaller CIS states and restrict their national
autonomy in the area of trade policy.
These considerations demonstrate that the applicability and, hence,
predictive power of gravity models are subject to some uncertainty in the
case of the CIS countries. It is clear, nevertheless, that if market-oriented
economic reforms are successfully implemented, the share of intra-
regional trade in the total trade of CIS economies will fall substantially
from its present level. The 1993 figures from Table 1 together with the
long-run estimates based on Aitken (1973) and Wang and Winters (1991)
suggest that in most CIS countries the intra-regional shares in foreign
trade might be reduced to no more than a quarter of their present levels.
Allowing for the impact of path dependence, it may be concluded that the
intra-regional trade shares will be roughly halved at least. To give an
impression of the magnitudes involved: If the average share of intra-CIS
trade in the total foreign trade of CIS countries is now approximately 70
percent (using the average of exports and imports; cf. Table 1), then its
long term level will be in the order of 35 percent at best.28
It is hardly conceivable that a reduction of this size can be reached at
without a further fall in the volume of intra-CIS trade. The rationale behind
this conclusion may be illustrated with a back-of-the-envelope calculation:
Assume that both the volume of intra CIS trade and the overall trade-to-
GDP ratio remain constant. If the share of intra-regional in total trade is to
decrease from 70 to 35 percent, then trade with the rest of the world has
to more than quadruple, and GDP has to more than double. If the trade-
to-GDP ratio is allowed to rise by one half, then GDP still has to grow by
40 percent. Both a quadrupling of extra-regional trade, and a large
increase in aggregate output, will hardly occur in the foreseeable future.
Even if the CIS countries push ahead with market-oriented reforms, extra-
regional exports will take time to expand while the distortions that favored
intra-CIS trade in the past will not take nearly as long to eliminate.
Therefore, if the orders of magnitude suggested by gravity models are any
guide.to the future at all, then intra-CIS trade will certainly not recover to
anything like its pre-1990 level in the foreseeable future, and will probably
decline even further from its present level.
4. Policy Implications
It has been shown in the preceding section that the decline in intra-CIS
trade was initially caused by the institutional void left by the collapse of
the central planning system. However, the ongoing formation of new
market-supporting institutions will not permit intra-CIS trade to recover to
its former level. Economic isolation from the rest of the world during the
Soviet period enabled enterprises to export to protected markets within
the former Soviet Union in spite of substantial, systemic inefficiency.
Market-oriented reforms, especially the liberalization of trade with the rest
of the world, have eliminated that protection. Furthermore, once29
enterprises in the CIS countries have successfully restructured, they are
likely to find profitable export opportunities increasingly outside the CIS.
These considerations suggest that it is now crucial to push ahead with
economic reforms that promote enterprise restructuring and eliminate
obstacles to extra-regional trade. Such reforms range widely from
macroeconomic stabilization (to improve the investment climate) to the
privatization of large enterprises. However, although the importance of
intra-CIS trade will be reduced, the formation of market-supporting
institutions still needs to be completed (Subsection 4.1). In addition, the
integration of the CIS countries into the multilateral trading system
requires a decision on whether to set up a regional integration scheme
and, if so, what form it should take (Subsections 4.2 and 4.3).
4.1 Policy Reforms to Improve the Institutional Framework for Intra-
CIS Trade
Significant progress has been made in many CIS countries in creating the
institutions that are necessary for the functioning of market relations
among economic agents. The task is far from completed, however, and
this section lists some of the areas relevant to intra-CIS trade where there
is a need for further reforms. First, although the newly created currencies
of most CIS countries are in principle convertible, the currency markets
are still rudimentary and in some cases subject to intransparent
interventions by the national central banks. Inter-state payments can now
frequently be made through correspondent accounts of commercial
banks, but costs are still high. Further reform of financial systems should
aim to increase the level of competition, including increased participation
of Western commercial banks that could introduce much thoroughly
needed know-how.30
Second, export restrictions still exist in several CIS countries with the
objective of insulating regulated domestic markets from higher prices in
both intra- and extra-regional trade. Such price controls for tradable inputs
.distort competition between firms in different CIS countries, and prevent
the emergence of appropriate incentives for structural change. Full
.internal price liberalization would reduce the waste of resources resulting
•from inappropriately low prices, and could also contribute to fiscal
consolidation if it were linked to the introduction of a resource tax
capturing the resource rents for the state budget.
Third, there are still remnants of state trading in intra-CIS trade in the form
of several bilateral government agreements on trade in a limited number
of products. Although all remaining agreements now appear to be
indicative rather than binding on enterprises, and only set quantitative
targets rather than prices (cf. Lucke 1995, for the case of Belarus), there
is still a lingering suspicion that economic rents are being allocated by
essential administrative procedures. If the existing agreements were
allowed to expire without being replaced, this would increase
transparency in intra-CIS trade and demonstrate to all enterprises that
they have to market their products on their own account rather than
'through government agreements.
4.2 Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Regional
Reintegration
Varying groups of CIS member countries have made attempts at creating
a free trade area or customs union. This raises the related questions of
what the advantages of any discriminatory trade agreement would be, and
what form it should take. The rationale behind the integration attempts
has probably been mainly to create a stable policy regime for intra-CIS31
trade at a time when bilateral inter-governmental barter agreements
(which were initially concluded by many CIS member states) turned out to
be ineffective. At the same time, trade outside these agreements was
seriously hampered by export barriers. A trade integration scheme would
also benefit the smaller CIS countries by giving them guaranteed access
to the large Russian market.
Regarding the shape of institutional arrangements for regional integration,
the choices of the CIS countries are restricted by the fact that nearly all of
them have applied to join the World Trade Organization. Hence any
integration scheme would need to conform to the two conditions laid down
in Article 24 of GATT 1994: first, that on balance, barriers to imports from
third countries should not become higher; and second, that substantially
all intra-regional trade should be covered by the agreement.
The first condition should not represent a serious problem because
barriers against imports from the rest of the world are not very high
presently in any CIS country. The second condition, however, would imply
that trade in raw materials and energy must be freed from all barriers,
including those on exports, during a reasonable transition period. (Trade
in energy products clearly constitutes a "substantial" share of intra-CIS
trade.) Russia would thus be required either to increase its domestic
energy prices to the substantially higher levels now prevailing in intra-CIS
trade, or to subsidize other CIS countries by exporting energy materials at
Russian domestic prices; so far, the Russian government has carefully
avoided taking either measure.
If the two basic conditions laid down in Article 24 of GATT 1994 are
satisfied, the choice between a free trade area and a customs union
depends on how much protection against imports from third countries is32
desired. As discussed in Section 3.2.4 above, however, the decisions by
the smaller CIS countries are constrained by the approach chosen by
Russia. Three broadly defined scenarios are conceivable:
First, Russia might adopt a liberal trade policy towards third countries,
with relatively uniform levels of protection across sectors, and using only
import tariffs. In this case, the smaller CIS states would be well-advised to
join Russia in a customs union where the Russian tariff structure would
become the common external tariff. This would give the smaller states
guaranteed and preferential access to the important Russian market, and
simultaneously commit them to maintaining a liberal external trade
regime.
The second scenario involves Russia opting for a Highly protectionist,
sectorally selective trade policy towards third countries. High overall
levels of protection for industry would hurt the interests of small, resource-
poor CIS states in integrating fully into the international division of labour
and becoming competitive exporters of non-traditional manufactures.
Hence their first-best choice would be to adopt a liberal, non-
discriminatory trade regime and treat imports from Russia and other
trading partners alike. Doing so, however, would undermine their present
preferential access to the Russian market since Russia would probably
respond by subjecting imports from CIS countries to the same
protectionist policy regime as imports from the rest of the world. Faced
with the prospect of losing access to the important Russian market, the
smaller CIS states might be coerced into a customs union with Russia.
The third scenario assumes that Russia moves towards an increasingly
protectionist position without, however, making this an explicit policy or
exerting pressure on other CIS member states to follow suit. To some33
extent, this scenario reflects the situation prevailing in mid-1995. Under
such conditions a free trade area could be implemented among the CIS
countries where trade policies towards the rest of the world would be
decided nationally. While this approach would accept strong economic
ties with Russia as a (transitory) legacy of the Soviet system, it would also
allow the smaller CIS states to benefit from free access to their main
export market while Russia would not be allowed to restrict commodity
exports.
A free trade area would depend on the implementation of intra-regional
customs borders in order to enforce rules of origin for products benefiting
from preferential treatment. The experiences with free trade areas among
developing countries demonstrate that rules of origin can lead to trade
barriers if they are managed restrictively and under rent-seeking targets.
Likewise it is known from the EFTA experience that rules of origin are of
minor importance if external tariffs of member states are similar and low,
and if intra-regional trade is relatively small. The lesson for CIS countries
would be to discourage rent-seeking from the very beginning by framing
similar, rational trading regimes with low uniform tariff rates.
Further it would have to be decided how value added taxes should be
levied. The significance of this decision is demonstrated by the single
market in the European Union where intra-regional trade is no longer
subject to any border controls. The country of origin principle which is now
applied in the European Union would allow for competition among
different national tax regulations: all domestically produced goods
(including exports to CIS countries) would be subject to VAT, tax
revenues would accrue to the producing country, and purchasers would
be free to buy products within the CIS wherever VAT is lowest. Hence34
applying the country of origin principle in the context of a customs union
would render all border controls of intra-regional trade unnecessary.
On the other hand, the country of destination principle would give tax
authorities more autonomy, which might be desirable in view of the need
for fiscal restructuring and the difficulties inherent in implementing
alternative, direct taxes. Under the country of destination principle, VAT
would be levied on imports at the border, while tax paid in the course of
the production chain on products ultimately exported would be refunded.
4.3 The CIS Countries As Trading Partners: A View From the OECD
Since 1993 the OECD countries have formally treated the CIS member
states as separate partner countries. They have also granted preferences
under the GSP on a country-by-country basis, which presupposes that
each CIS state is a separate customs territory with full control over its
trade policy. Given wide-spread institutional disorder in intra-CIS trade,
however, the OECD approach must be viewed as anticipating the future,
rather than being fully consistent with present conditions. As of mid-1995,
at least, the customs territories of the individual CIS states could not, in
practice, be separated from each other satisfactorily.
This state of affairs has created problems for CIS exports of sensitive,
: import-restricted products to the OECD. Because of the limited
competitiveness of CIS producers of manufactures, these are mainly
primary or basic processed commodities where certificates of origin can
easily be faked due to product homogeneity. Therefore, for example, the
European Union reacted to a surge in aluminium imports in 1993 by
imposing a single import quota for the whole territory of the former Soviet
Union (aluminium plants are spread widely across the former Soviet35
Union). This procedure was at odds not only with the current political
situation (the Russian and Ukrainian governments were quarreling about
a wide range of issues), but also with the European Union's own foreign
trade statistics where the individual CIS states were already treated as
separate partner countries.
Any preferential treatment of CIS states by means of tariff quotas or tariff
ceilings, or provisions for the cumulation of national value added in any
future free trade agreements between OECD and CIS countries, require
that the customs territories of the CIS countries are effectively separated.
Therefore OECD countries would probably welcome a clear-cut decision
either in favor of a CIS customs union, or a water-proof separation of
national customs territories with effective border controls (for instance in
the framework of a CIS free trade area). The current in-between status
bears the risk that OECD countries may again be tempted to apply "total
former USSR" quotas.
5. Conclusions
It has been found that the proximate cause of the decline in the volume of
intra-CIS trade was the institutional void left by the collapse of the central
planning system in the former Soviet Union. However, the formation of
market-supporting institutions, which has progressed significantly in many
CIS countries, will not in itself permit a recovery of intra-CIS trade to its
former level. To a large extent, trade among the former Soviet republics
depended upon the protection that was provided by the economic
isolation of the former Soviet Union from the rest of the world. Now that
market-oriented reforms are eliminating that protection, many of the
traditional trade relationships become unviable. On the other hand, fully36
restructured enterprises will increasingly find promising export markets
outside the CIS region.
These conclusions depend partly on the assumption that gravity models,
however imprecise, provide some guidance as to the future direction of
the external trade of the CIS countries, if and when market-oriented
economic reforms are implemented. However, the predicted reductions in
the share of intra-regional trade in the total foreign trade of the CIS
countries are so large as to instill some confidence in this assumption.
Even if elements of path dependence prevent the direction of trade of CIS
countries from fully adjusting to the pattern found among market
economies, the direction of change remains unambiguous.
These findings underline the importance of policy reforms that promote
industrial restructuring, eliminate obstacles to exports to the rest of the
world, and create a stable framework for investment in internationally
competitive industries. Otherwise the job losses in shrinking industries
cannot be compensated for. Although much reduced in importance, intra-
CIS trade also requires the attention of policy-makers. The formation of
market-supporting institutions needs to be completed, and a decision
needs to be taken on the format, if any, of a regional trade integration
scheme.37
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